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Abstract 
A recent Cornell Hospitality Quarterly article highlighted a unique natural experiment where an entire city 
had all its hotel delisted from all online travel agents for more than 4 years. The article provides great 
background to the delisting and highlights the impacts on hotel revenue and accommodation taxes for 
the county. The article estimates that even though the hotels relisted at all online travel agents (OTAs), 
there was a substantial gain to both hotels and accommodation tax collectors during the OTA delisting 
period. The impact estimates are based solely on the loss of demand realized in neighboring Phenix City, 
AL, once Columbus is relisted at OTAs. In the following, we highlight some concerns with these estimates 
and indicate that the losses may in fact be quite substantive and perhaps more indicative of why 
Columbus hotels relisted at the OTAs. 
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Research Note
Estimates of Impacts to Columbus
McLeod, Litvi, Heriot, Jauregui, and Dempsey (2017) esti-
mate the impact of OTA delisting by looking primarily at 
demand changes in Phenix City, AL (across the river and 
state line from Columbus). They estimate that once 
Columbus was relisted at the OTAs, Phenix City lost about 
18,000 rooms nights per year and used this loss post relist-
ing as the loss (gain to Phenix City) during the delisting 
phase of Columbus. They then estimate a tax gain to the city 
of Columbus of US$298,000 which is composed of a small 
loss of taxes on the 18,000 room nights per year (over 4.3 
years of delisting) which is offset by higher net taxable rates 
owing to a loss of OTA transactions (assuming 14.9% of 
transactions taxed at a lower net rate owing to the 20% esti-
mated OTA commissions).
Similarly, they estimate impacts upon hotels in Columbus 
through the loss of 18,000 annual room nights over the del-
isting period at US$5,542,000 (18k [annual lost rooms] × 
4.3 [years delisted] × US$71.60 [average delisting period 
Columbus average daily rate (ADR)]). But this substantive 
loss is offset by reductions in OTA commission of 
US$9,257,000 (1,009k [annual average number of room 
nights sold in the city during delisting] × 4.3 [years del-
isted] × US$71.60 [average delisting period Columbus 
ADR] × 14.9% [OTA normal market share] × 20% [average 
OTA markup]) for a net gain of US$3,715,000.
The result of putting the OTA Jenie back in the bottle in 
Columbus appears quite positive—so much so one might 
ask why the hotels bothered to relist!
McLeod et al. (2017) indicate that only 18,000 of the 
estimated 150,341 (14.9% of 1,009k) annual rooms sold on 
OTAs prior to delisting were lost to other markets based on 
room demand changes in Phenix City. It should be noted 
that while Phenix City is the next closet market, it only has 
one seventh of the room supply as Columbus (246k vs. 
1,720k rooms as of 2014), and perhaps this supply imbal-
ance might mean room nights are lost to other markets as 
well. They also assume that OTA delisting has no long-term 
impacts on pricing strategy within the Columbus market as 
revenue estimates are solely based on ADRs during the del-
isted period.
Alternative Estimates
While the delisting of hotels in Columbus, with Phenix City 
a stone’s throw across the river, is being a natural experi-
ment in OTA impacts, it is still very difficult to unravel the 
true impacts of OTA delisting owing to a lot of other factors 
not within control of the experiment. As discussed by 
McLeod et al. (2017), changes in market supply coupled 
with changes in demand make it difficult to ascertain 
impacts. One of the simplest methods to control for demand 
and supply changes is to evaluate impacts using indices 
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versus absolute values—so instead of focusing on ADRs in 
Columbus, focus on ADRs in Columbus relative to those in 
Phenix City.
Figure 1 displays RevPAR, ADR, and Occupancy before, 
during, and after OTA delisting in Columbus.1 To control for 
seasonality and the underlying changes in overall demand, 
the figure presents these metrics as indices—that is, RevPAR 
is RevPAR in Columbus/RevPAR in Phenix City. The figure 
illustrates that prior to delisting, Columbus generated a rate 
premium over Phenix City which translated into superior 
RevPAR performance—although this rate premium was 
readjusting in 2008 owing to the recession. Following delist-
ing, Columbus rates eroded very quickly; these rate reduc-
tions generated modest occupancy gains, but resulted in 
dramatically reduced overall performance as measured by 
RevPAR. Following relisting, Columbus never recovered its 
pricing power as ADRs continued to depreciate (relative to 
Phenix City) but relisting generated sufficient demand to 
elevate RevPAR (but not to predelisting levels).
Table 1 summarizes average performance indices dur-
ing the three periods and calculates ratios of the Delisted 
(Loss) and Relisted (Recovery) periods relative to perfor-
mance prior to delisting. The ratios further highlight the 
degree to which Columbus hotels lost control of their pric-
ing actions and failed to recover even after relisting (rela-
tive to Phenix City) as relisted prices are 35% less than 
those prior to delisting.
Table 1 and Figure 1 would indicate that Columbus 
hotels faired very poorly during delisting losing consider-
ably more (on a relative basis) to the estimated 18,000 
annual room nights—in fact one might argue they lost very 
few if any room nights (as occupancy indices increased). 
However, Columbus hotels aggressively reduced prices 
resulting in RevPAR (i.e., total revenue) dramatically 
decreasing. One thing to keep in mind is that revenues 
reported to Smith Travel Research (STR) are net revenues 
(net of all OTA commissions), so the RevPAR indices dur-
ing the listed and delisted periods already have all OTA 
commission savings built in—so there is no need to make 
any assumptions on channel mix or commissions as required 
in McLeod et al. (2017). But looking at Columbus/Phenix 
City indices may not be a very realistic measure of impact 
as it is most likely double counting the impact as some of 
the losses from Columbus become the gains to Phenix City. 
We can conservatively adjust for double counting through 
adjustment of the indices using the average performance 
across both markets in the denominator, that is,
Columbus
Columbus+Phenix City /2( )
.
We summarize these revised indices in Table 2.
Figure 1.
Hotel Performance Indices (Columbus/Phenix City).
Table 1.
Hotel Performance Indices (Columbus/Phenix City).
RevPAR ADR Occupancy
Listed 1.54 1.57 0.99
Delisted 1.20 1.15 1.05
Relisted 1.26 1.02 1.23
Loss 77.6% 73.5% 106.2%
Recovery 81.4% 65.2% 124.8%
Note. RevPAR = revenue per available room; ADR = average daily room 
rate.
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Table 2 shows that after adjusting for double counting, 
RevPAR losses during delisting were a little more than 10% 
with only 2% of these losses recovered upon relisting with 
these losses stemming from dramatically reduced prices in 
Columbus (relative to Phenix City).
One last minor comment on accommodation tax impacts. 
In McLeod et al. (2017), they assume that during delisting, 
incremental taxes would be recovered on all OTA bookings 
(assuming they moved to other channels); this assumption 
fails to incorporate the fact that the entire tax issue focused 
on Merchant OTA bookings (transactions where the OTA 
was the merchant of record with taxes recovered on net 
rates to OTAs—rate minus commission). All OTA bookings 
made at Booking.com and some at Priceline.com (after 
2011) and Expedia.com (during 2012) are executed in the 
so-called Retail model where the hotel is the merchant of 
record, and as a result, accommodation taxes are paid on the 
full retail selling price (not net price as in the Merchant 
model). The retail or pay when you stay in OTA model does 
not require consumers to pay in advance as they simply pay 
at departure like most hotel reservations, and thus, accom-
modation taxes are on the full room rate with the hotel 
remitting commissions to the OTA after the stay. The mer-
chant model has the OTA “paying” the hotel the net rate and 
OTAs argued that this was the actual rate paid to the hotel 
and as such should be the rate accommodation taxes are 
based on. As a result of this change in transaction mode, 
some (not all) of the tax savings would have been recog-
nized even if Columbus had remained listed at OTAs.
The goal of this note is not to put a firm number of the 
impacts of delisting as done in McLeod et al. (2017) but 
rather highlight the implications of the assumptions they 
made. We illustrate an alternative view of the impacts of 
delisting, one which controls demand and supply changes 
through use of indices versus use of absolute demand num-
bers. We further highlight that McLeod et al. (2017) assume 
all demand lost from Columbus spilled over to Phenix City 
which seems very aggressive as Columbus hotels displayed 
for OTA searches performed for numerous nearby markets 
not just Phenix City.
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Table 2.
Adjusted Hotel Performance Indices.
RevPAR ADR Occupancy
Listed 1.21 1.22 0.99
Delisted 1.09 1.07 1.02
Relisted 1.11 1.01 1.10
Loss 89.9% 87.6% 102.9%
Recovery 91.8% 82.9% 111.1%
Note. RevPAR = revenue per available room; ADR = average daily room 
rate.
